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DON’T PUT A CORK IN
GRANHOLM V. HEALD:
NEW YORK’S BAN ON INTERSTATE
DIRECT SHIPMENTS OF WINE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Andre Nance*
INTRODUCTION
A new chapter is unfolding in a liquor saga seventy-five years
in the making that now concerns New York’s use of a state ban on
interstate direct shipments of wine to grant in-state retailers
exclusive access to New York’s lucrative direct shipment market at
the expense of out-of-state competitors. 1 Such state-level economic
*

Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2009; M.A., University of Virginia,
2005; B.A., McGill University, 2003. I deeply thank all who made this Note
possible, especially my wife, Nancy. Special thanks to Prof. Nelson Tebbe,
Devin Taylor, Susanne Flanders, Nicole Roodhuyzen, and Nick Reiter.
1
This year marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Repeal of Prohibition
by the Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution on December
5, 1933. Not limited to New York, this new chapter has national dimensions
and is being written both in the courthouse and the legislature, with federal
district courts in New York, Michigan, and Texas differing on how to address
similarly discriminatory direct shipping bans, and legislatures in Maine,
Tennessee, Virginia, Rhode Island, and Alabama considering revisions to their
direct shipping laws. See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL
2984127 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2007); Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp.
2d 848 (N.D. Tex. 2008); see generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: W INE , 6 (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf [hereinafter FTC
REPORT]; Reuters, Texas Judge Calls Bans on Wine Retailer Shipping
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protectionism suffered a major defeat in 2005, when out-of-state
wineries challenged the interstate ban in Granholm v. Heald and
the Supreme Court concluded that allowing in-state wineries to
bypass wholesalers and retailers and to ship directly to in-state
consumers but denying such rights to out-of-state wineries and
shippers violated the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution.2 With this decision, the Supreme
Court gave its imprimatur of approval to a balancing standard that
Unconstitutional, RUETERS, Jan. 15, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/pressRelease/idUS21135+16-Jan-2008+BW20080116?sp=true;
Posting of Sarah Werner to SHIPCOMPLIANT BLOG , Rhode Island and
Alabama: Let My Pinot Go!, http://shipcompliantblog.com/blog/ (Mar. 27,
2008, 11:23 EST).
2
See 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (“States may not enact laws that burden
out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to instate businesses. This mandate ‘reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that
was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the
Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.’”)
(quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979)). In Granholm,
Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion, while Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O’Connor, and
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, filed
dissenting opinions. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 464.
U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 3, otherwise known as the Commerce Clause,
grants Congress the exclusive power “to regulate commerce . . . among the
several states . . .” and is understood not only as an affirmative “grant of power
to Congress to regulate interstate commerce” but also as an “implied limitation
on States from regulating matters that interfere with interstate commerce—the
so-called ‘Dormant’ Commerce Clause.” Michael A. Lawrence, Toward A
More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework,
21 HARV . J.L. & PUB. P OL ’ Y 395, 407 (1998).
The effect of Granholm on direct-to-consumer shipping has been profound.
See Garrett Peck, The Future of the Three-Tier System, 84.4 BEVERAGE MEDIA
METRO NEW YORK 22, 26–27 (2008) (quoting Wine America president Bill
Nelson: “Granholm opened markets for direct-to-consumer shipping. ‘We’ve
moved from 27 to 35 states because of the Supreme Court decision.’”) (quoting
Free the Grapes! executive director Jeremy Benson: “Wineries have the option
of shipping into states that represent 81% of U.S. wine consumption, up form
50% in January 2005.”); see also Free the Grapes! Press Releases, available at
http://www.freethegrapes.org/news.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
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weighs and attempts to harmonize the federal Commerce Clause
interest in free trade among the states against each state’s Twentyfirst Amendment interest in regulating alcohol.3 Although an
exception to the interstate direct shipping ban now exists for outof-state wineries, New York continues to engage in economic
protectionism at the expense of out-of-state retailers. 4
With the national wine retail market standing at thirty billion
dollars in 2007 and New Yorkers consuming far more wine than
any other market except California and Florida, the stakes are high,
and the State of New York has understandably, if shortsightedly,
tried to favor resident businesses by banning direct shipments to
consumers by their out-of-state competitors. 5 In September 2007,
3

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm, other courts applied
this balancing standard. See, e.g., Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 519 (4th
Cir. 2003) (“With the elimination of the local preference statute, no interest of
the Twenty-first Amendment is implicated, yet the discrimination violating the
Commerce Clause is eliminated.”); see also Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Interplay
Between Twenty-First Amendment and Commerce Clause Concerning State
Regulation of Intoxicating Liquors, 116 A.L.R. 5th 149 (2004).
4
This economic protectionism involves an almost textbook case of facial
discrimination against interstate commerce. In Granholm, the Court noted that
it had struck down New York laws that “directly regulate[] or discriminate[]
against interstate commerce, or when [their] effect is to favor in-state economic
interests over out-of-state interests.” 544 U.S. at 487 (quoting Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)); see
also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (“Shielding in-state industries
from out-of-state competition is almost never a legitimate local purpose, and
state laws that amount to ‘simple economic protectionism’ consequently have
been subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity.’”) (quoting City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see also City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (“The clearest example of such legislation is a
law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State’s borders.”);
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981); H. P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403–06 (1949); Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 525 (1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1925);
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
5
In 2003, New Yorkers consumed 20,336,000 cases of wine behind
California’s 46,067,000 and Florida’s 20,588,000 but well ahead of Texas’s
fourth-place 12,791,000. See ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP, CONSUMPTION OF
T OTAL W INE RANKED BY STATE, 1993–2003 (TOP 12), available at
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the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York determined in Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle that New York’s
interest in using its ban on interstate shipping to favor in-state
retailers so outweighed the federal interest in free trade that the
court declined “to undertake a dormant Commerce Clause analysis”
and simply assessed New York’s use of the ban as “within the
authority granted to New York by the Twenty-first Amendment.”6
Using suspect logic, the court held that New York’s use of the
direct shipping ban to favor in-state retailers was “integral” to New
York’s three-tier system of regulating the importation and sale of
wine.7 The reality, however, is more complex, and requires a more
nuanced and measured approach than that found in Arnold’s Wines.
Under a basic three-tier liquoring licensing and distribution
system, a state issues licenses to producers, wholesalers, and
retailers, who must operate separately.8 In the case of wine,
wineries licensed as producers make it, wholesalers distribute it,

http://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=disp
lay_aeg&doc_ID=1825 (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (citing ADAMS BEVERAGE
GROUP, 2004 W INE HANDBOOK (2004)); see also The Wine Institute, 2007
California Wine Sales: Up 2 Percent in U.S. As Wine Continues to Gain
Popularity Among Americans, available at http://www.wineinstitute.org/
resources/statistics/article122 (last visited Apr. 4, 2008) (listing the national
retail market at 30 billion dollars); MKF RESEARCH, T HE IMPACT OF W INE ,
GRAPES AND GRAPE PRODUCTS ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 2007: FAMILY
BUSINESSES BUILDING VALUE 3 (2007), available at http://www.house.
gov/radanovich/wine/documents/Economic_Impact_on_National_Economy_200
7.pdf.
6
515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); contra Siesta Vill. Mkt.
v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
7
See Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 413–14.
8
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466 (citing FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–
7). Federal and state laws limit vertical overlap between tiers of licensees. Id.
(citing FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5; 27 U.S.C. § 205 (2007); Bainbridge
v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 2002)); see also Arnold’s Wines,
Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (“The three-tiers refer to: (1) the producer; (2) the
distributor or wholesaler; and (3) the retailer. Under the three-tier system, a
producer sells its wine to a licensed in-state wholesaler, who pays excise taxes
and delivers the wine to a licensed in-state retailer. The retailer, in turn, sells the
wine to consumers and, where applicable, collects sales taxes.”).
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and retailers sell it to the public.9 Focusing on the Supreme Court’s
general approval of this system, the Arnold’s Wines court
interpreted Granholm as addressing only an exception to the threetier systemshipping laws that allow wineries to bypass
wholesalers and retailers by shipping directly to the publicand
not other aspects of the three-tier system that discriminate against
out-of-state businesses. 10
Subsequent decisions in two nearly identical Michigan and
Texas cases have differed from the outcome in New York, and the
Texas court even criticized the Arnold’s Wines decision as “a
misreading of Granholm . . . [that] elevates a state’s rights under
the Twenty-first Amendment to a level that improperly
supersedes the dormant Commerce Clause.”11 These courts rightly
disagreed with the Arnold’s Wines assertion that the Twenty-first
Amendment completely shields New York’s discriminatory
shipping laws from Commerce Clause analysis. 12 Though a final
district court decision in Michigan is pending, bans on direct
shipments from out-of-state retailers are now unconstitutional in
Texas, and the New York decision, in declining to balance fully the
federal interest in free trade against New York’s interest in

9

See N.Y. ALCO. BEV . CONT . LAW §§ 3(20), (26), (35), 103–05 (Gould

2007).
10

See Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 411. In doing so, the
Arnold’s Wines decision tried to isolate wineries from retailers, two of the three
tiers of licensees New York, Michigan, and Texas use to regulate alcohol, a
regulatory scheme “under which alcohol producers must go through wholesalers
and distributors, who must in turn go through retailers, who can then sell to
consumers.” Vijay Shanker, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, The Commerce
Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 V A . L. REV . 353, 353 (1999).
11
Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 867 n.19; see also Siesta Vill. Mkt. v.
Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12,
2007).
12
The Twenty-first Amendment granted states the power to regulate
alcohol. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. In particular, Section 2 of the
amendment states: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use there in of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. CONST .
amend. XXI, § 2.
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regulating alcohol, is deeply flawed.13
If the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits uphold these district
court opinions, the Supreme Court itself will soon have to resolve
the conflicting interpretations of Granholm. In the Granholm
decision itself, though, the Court gave an indication of how it will
approach the matter by declaring that discrimination is “neither
authorized nor permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment,”
“contrary to the Commerce Clause[,] and . . . not saved by the
Twenty-first Amendment.”14 The Court further explained that the
“Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the
Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule that
States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own
producers” and that “[s]tates may not enact laws . . . simply to
give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.”15 Most of all,
the Court determined that “[Section 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment] does not allow States to regulate the direct shipment
of wine on terms that discriminate. . . .”16 New York has no
compelling justification for discriminating against out-of-state
retailers, and striking down this differential treatment does not
abrogate New York’s core Twenty-first Amendment rights.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court will likely strike down New
York’s use of the ban on interstate direct shipping to favor in-state
retailers.17
Part One of this Note argues that, contrary to the analysis of
the recent New York Arnold’s Wines decision, the federal interest
in free trade with respect to interstate wine shipping is quite
strong.18 As a threshold matter, New York discriminates between
“similarly situated” entitiesin-state and out-of-state retailers
13

See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]his Court is not aware of any pre-Granholm authority
calling into question the legitimacy of state laws that limit licenses to retailers
and wholesalers located within the state.”).
14
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466, 489 (2005).
15
Id. at 486, 472.
16
Id. at 476.
17
See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D.
Tex. 2008).
18
Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2. at 862–64, 867.
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that would compete in New York’s wine consumer market, and
thus the State invites a high level of judicial scrutiny.19 The ban on
direct to customer shipments into the state creates a legal barrier
limiting access to New York’s market.20 The burden on interstate
commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to the two local benefits
New York put forward—efficient tax collection and preventing
minors’ access to alcohol—because these benefits can be achieved
without discriminating against out-of-state businesses by requiring
all retailers to file taxes in a timely fashion and all shippers to
require an adult signature upon delivery. 21
Part Two of this Note argues that the national interest in free
19

See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 307 n.15 (1997) (“[I]f a
State discriminates against out-of-state interests by drawing geographical
distinctions between entities that are otherwise similarly situated, such facial
discrimination will be subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny even if it is
directed toward a legitimate health and safety goal.”); see, e.g., City of
Philadelphia. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–28 (1978); Dean Milk Co. v.
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353–54 (1951).
20
New York shipping laws expressly prohibit shipments to consumers that
originate outside the state. See N.Y. ALCO . BEV . CONT . LAW §§ 102(1)(a),
102(1)(b) (Gould 2007) (prohibiting shipments “into the state”). In contrast,
shipments originating within the state are authorized. See N.Y. ALCO . BEV .
CONT . LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007). As a “package store licensee,” a New York wine
retailer may sell and deliver liquor and wine “to homes and offices not to be
resold by the purchaser[;] by messenger afoot[;] by trucking and delivery
companies who hold a trucking permit issued by the Authority[; and] in a
vehicle owned and operated, or hired and operated by the package store
licensee.” New York State Liquor Authority Compliance FAQs, available at
http://abc.state.ny.us/JSP/content/faq.jsp (last visited Apr. 2, 2008) [hereinafter
NYSLA Compliance FAQs].
21
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 491 (2005); see also Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”) (emphasis
added).
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trade among the states outweighs New York’s interest in using its
ban on interstate direct shipping to grant in-state retailers exclusive
access to New York’s direct shipping consumer market. Though
Granholm, on the facts, pertains to direct shipping by wineries and
the differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state producers, 22
the plain language of Granholm stresses the need to protect out-ofstate “economic interests” broadly from economic protectionism,
not producers exclusively.23 Banning shipments by out-of-state
retailers is not critical to maintaining the centralized control of New
York’s “unquestionably legitimate” three-tier system.24 Though
wine shipped directly to New York consumers by out-of-state
retailers would bypass in-state wholesalers, 25 New York can
maintain centralized control over out-of-state retailers and enforce
compliance with its regulations “by requiring a permit as a
condition of direct shipping.”26 Without an exception for out-ofstate retailers, however, New York’s use of the ban on direct
shipping clearly burdens interstate commerce in a way unnecessary
to maintaining New York’s central control in regulating alcohol.27
Part Three of this Note further argues that extending the current
permit exception to New York’s ban on interstate direct shipments
does not abrogate New York’s right to regulate alcohol. Though the
Twenty-first Amendment is understood to grant New York
“virtually complete control” over in-state liquor distribution,28
22

See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472.
Id. (“This Court has long held that, in all but the narrowest
circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate
‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits
the former and burdens the latter.’”) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
24
See id. at 488–89 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S.
423, 432 (1990)); see also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 447 (Scalia J.,
concurring).
25
See N.Y. ALCO . BEV . C ONT . LAW §§ 1–164 (2007).
26
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491; see also Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F.
Supp. 2d 848, 867 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
27
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488–89 (2005) (quoting North
Dakota, 493 U.S. at 432).
28
Cal. Retail Liquor Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 100
(1980); see also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432 (holding that the three-tier
23
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“there is a marked difference between ‘virtually complete control’
and absolute control.”29 Further, extending the permit exception to
the ban has no effect on New York’s ability to regulate alcohol
using the three-tier system.30 Unless New York establishes that
these core interests are impaired in a concrete way, it cannot be
said as a matter of law that New York’s Twenty-first Amendment
interest in using the ban to favor in-state businesses outweighs the
federal Commerce Clause interest in promoting free trade.31
For these reasons, this Note argues that the decision in
Arnold’s Wines should be overturned.32 As it stands, New York’s
use of the ban on interstate direct shipping denies out-of-state
retailers access to New York’s lucrative wine consumer market,
facially discriminating against out-of-state economic interests while
providing in-state retailers with exclusive access.33 This Note
argues that New York can and must give out-of-state retailers
system is “unquestionably legitimate”).
29
Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2007) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Ass’n, 445 U.S. at
100).
30
In Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, New York did not make a concrete
showing of any harm to the three-tier system, instead asserting only that
“requiring alcohol to pass through the three-tier system allows the State to
collect taxes more efficiently and to decrease the sale of alcohol to minors” and
that “[d]irect shipment laws . . . are integral to maintaining centralized control
over alcohol sales because they ensure that every drop of alcohol flows through
the three-tier system.” 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Without
concrete evidence to support these assertions, New York failed the standard set
by the Supreme Court: “Our Commerce Clause cases demand more than mere
speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods.” Granholm,
544 U.S. at 492. “The Court has upheld state regulations that discriminate
against interstate commerce only after finding, based on concrete record evidence,
that a State's nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable.” Id. at 493.
31
Id.
32
See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D.
Tex. 2008); see also Siesta Vill. Mkt., 2007 WL 2984127, at *4–5.
33
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (“Shielding in-state
industries from out-of-state competition is almost never a legitimate local
purpose, and state laws that amount to ‘simple economic protectionism’
consequently have been subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity.’”)
(quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
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“access [to its market] . . . on equal terms.”34
I. NEW YORK’S BAN ON DIRECT SHIP PING VIOLATES THE
F EDERAL C OMMERCE C LAUSE I NTEREST IN FREE TRADE
When states attempt to regulate interstate commerce, they
encroach on Congress’s exclusive power under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution “[t]o regulate Commerce.
. . among the several States.”35 According to James Madison, a
“dormant” or “negative” aspect of the Clause
grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States
in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative
and preventive provision against injustice among the States
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the
positive purposes of the General Government, in which
alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged,
and this dormant aspect is understood to limit state’s power to
enact laws that interfere with or burden interstate commerce.36
New York’s shipping laws implicate this constitutional
“prohibition against border-closing laws” by giving unequal
treatment to in-state and out-of-state wine retailers.37 By assigning
to in-state retailers the right to ship directly to New York
consumers while generally denying this right to out-of-state
retailers, New York engages in the kind of blatant economic
protectionism that clearly benefits in-state businesses at the
expense of out-of-state competitors. 38
34

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see generally, e.g., NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36–38 (1937).
36
Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (1911) (Max Farrand,
ed., 1st Am. ed. 1911) (quoted in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512
U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994)).
37
See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir.
2000); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997); Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S.
275, 280 (1875); Cooley v. Bd. of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851).
38
See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148; see also City of Philadelphia v. New
35
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A. In-State and Out-of-State Wine Retailers are “Similarly
Situated” for Dormant Commerce Clause Purposes
A threshold question in determining whether a state law
violates the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause is whether the
in-state and out-of-state entities in question are “similarly
situated.”39 There can be no violation of this dormant aspect unless
in-state and out-of-state wine retailers are “similarly situated.”40
The Supreme Court has found that entities are similarly situated
when there exists “actual or prospective competition between the
supposedly favored and disfavored entities in a single market.”41
Further, the Supreme Court explained:
[If] the different entities serve different markets, and would
continue to do so even if the supposedly discriminatory
burden were removed. . . [,] eliminating the . . . regulatory
differential would not serve the dormant Commerce
Clause’s fundamental objective of preserving a national
market for competition undisturbed by preferential
advantages conferred by a State upon its residents or
resident competitors. 42
Where, as here, in-state and out-of-state wine retailers engage in the
same business—selling wine to retail consumers—and seek access
to the exact same market—New York’s lucrative wine consumer
base—the retailers are potential competitors that are “similarly
situated” for purposes of the dormant aspect of the Commerce
Clause.43

Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
39
Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997).
40
Id. at 298–99.
41
Id. at 300.
42
Id. at 299.
43
The Texas district court approached this threshold issue in the same way
and reached the same conclusion. See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp.
2d 848, 873–74 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
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B. New York Discriminates Against Interstate Commerce by
Allowing In-State Retailers to Ship Directly to New York
Consumers and Banning Shipments by Out-of-State
Retailers

Through a combination of shipping provisions promulgated
under its Alcohol Beverage Control Law (“ABC Law”), New York
discriminates against out-of-state wine retailers.44 First, New York
authorizes wine retailers residing in New York to sell and ship wine
directly to consumers within New York.45 Second, New York
generally prohibits wine shipments “into the state,” unless the instate recipient is a licensed wholesaler or the out-of-state shipper
has previously received a permit available only to licensed out-ofstate wineries.46 Together, these shipping provisions mandate
“differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”47 This
combination of shipping provisions facially discriminates against
out-of-state business interests, including wine retailers, by singling
out shipments “into the state” while ignoring shipments originating
within New York, thereby effectively giving in-state retailers
exclusive access to New York’s consumers while denying out-ofstate wine retailers access to the same market. 48
Specifically, ABC Law provisions 94, 105.8, 105.9, and 116,
and Rule 10 of the Rules of the State Liquor Authority authorize
44

See N.Y. ALCO . BEV . C ONT . LAW §§ 1–164 (Gould 2007).
See N.Y. ALCO . BEV . CONT . LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould
2007); N.Y. C OMP. CODES R. & R EGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007).
46
N.Y. ALCO. BEV . CONT . LAW §§ 79(c), 102(1)(a), 102(1)(b) (Gould
2007); N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory: Direct Shipment of Wine to New
York Customers by Wine Manufacturers Located outside New York (Aug. 5,
2005), http://www.abc.state.ny.us/system/files/advisory-out-of-state-winery.pdf.
47
Id.; see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988)
(“[S]tate statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are
routinely struck down.”).
48
See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93,
99 (1994); see also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 39 (1980)
(holding that a statute burdens interstate commerce if “it overtly prevents foreign
enterprises from competing in local markets”).
45
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in-state retailers to sell and ship wine directly to consumers.49 As a
“package store licensee,” a New York retailer may deliver the wine
that they sell: “to homes and offices not to be resold by the
purchaser[;] by messenger afoot[;] by trucking and delivery
companies who hold a trucking permit issued by the Authority[;
and] in a vehicle owned and operated, or hired and operated by the
package store licensee.”50 To become such a licensee, a candidate
residing in New York applies to the agency that oversees
enforcement of the state’s ABC Laws, the New York State Liquor
Authority (“NYSLA”).51 If the NYSLA approves the application,
the newly licensed New York retailer can deliver directly to a New
York consumer’s residence immediately.52
Meanwhile, ABC Law provisions 100(1), 102(1)(a), and
102(1)(b) ban all direct shipments “into the state” and generally
require all wine shipped into the state to pass first through a New
York business entity, a wholesaler, licensed by the State of New
York.53 Because of this general prohibition against direct shipments
into the state, even if out-of-state retailers were eligible for retail
licenses within the state, those out-of-state retailers who had
received licenses would still be prohibited from shipping directly
“into the state” to New York consumers.54
49

See N.Y. ALCO . BEV . C ONT . LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, and 116 (Gould
2007); N.Y. C OMP. CODES R. & R EGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007).
50
NYSLA Compliance FAQs, supra note 20.
51
See Welcome to New York State Liquor Authority, http://abc.state.
ny.us/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
52
See N.Y. ALCO . BEV . CONT . LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould
2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007); see also NYSLA
Compliance FAQs, supra note 20.
53
N.Y. A LCO. B EV . C ONT . LAW § 100(1) (Gould 2007) (“No person shall
manufacture for sale or sell at wholesale or retail any alcoholic beverage within
the state without obtaining the appropriate license therefor required by this
chapter.”); § 102(1)(a) (“[N]o alcoholic beverages shall be shipped into the state
unless the same shall be consigned to a person duly licensed hereunder to traffic
in alcoholic beverages.”); § 102(1)(b) (“[N]o common carrier or other person
shall bring or carry into the state any alcoholic beverages, unless the same shall
be consigned to a person duly licensed hereunder to traffic in alcoholic
beverages. . . .”).
54
See NYSLA Compliance FAQs, supra note 20; see also N.Y. ALCO.
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In an exception to this general ban on interstate shipping,
however, in the aftermath of Granholm, out-of-state wineries have
won the right to apply for an “Out of State Direct Shipper’s
License” that permits them to ship directly to New York
consumers.55 This direct shipping permit operates as an exception
to New York’s ban on direct shipments into the state. The permit,
however, is only available to persons who are recognized as wine
producers by the federal government and another state.56 As such,
out-of-state wine retailers, who do not produce wine themselves,
are ineligible for this permit.57 Under the status quo, then, out-ofstate retailers are deprived both of the opportunity to sell wine
directly to customers within New York and the right to deliver
wine to customers within New York.58 Meanwhile, their retail
counterparts and would-be competitors in New York receive these
advantages by virtue of being located within the state.59 This
combination of laws confers markedly different rights to in-state
and out-of-state retailers with respect to their ability to sell and
deliver wine directly to New York consumers.
New York’s discrimination against out-of-state wine retailers
strikingly mirrors its discrimination against out-of-state wineries
that was struck down by the Supreme Court in Granholm.60 In
that case, when faced with New York’s statutory scheme of
allowing its own wineries to bypass in-state wholesalers and
retailers and to sell directly to consumers while denying such a

BEV . CONT . LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & R EGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007).
55
See N.Y. ALCO. BEV . CONT . LAW § 79(c) (Gould 2007). There are also
quantity limits. See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory: Direct Shipment of
Wine to New York Customers by Wine Manufacturers Located outside New
York (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.abc.state.ny.us/system/files/advisory-out-ofstate-winery.pdf.
56
See N.Y. ALCO . BEV . C ONT . LAW § 79(c) (Gould 2007).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See NYSLA Compliance FAQs, supra note 20; see also N.Y. ALCO .
BEV . CONT . LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & R EGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007).
60
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
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clear economic advantage to out-of-state wineries, the Supreme
Court had “no difficulty concluding that New York . . . [had]
discriminate[d] against interstate commerce through its directshipping laws”61 and struck down New York’s discriminatory
scheme.62 The Granholm majority found that “[a]llowing States to
discriminate against out-of-state [wine producers] ‘invite[s] a
multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very
purpose of the Commerce Clause.’”63 Similarly, New York’s facial
discrimination against out-of-state wine retailers creates a de facto
preferential trade area and gives New York wine retailers exclusive
access to New York consumers.64 By burdening interstate
commerce to favor in-state businesses, New York’s direct shipping
laws inhibit free trade among the states and violate the dormant
aspect of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

61

Id. at 476. The Granholm majority’s succinct criticism of both schemes
is well illustrated by its comments regarding Michigan’s discriminatory
scheme:
Michigan allows in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers,
subject only to a licensing requirement. Out-of-state wineries, whether
licensed or not, face a complete ban on direct shipment. The differential
treatment requires all out-of-state wine, but not all in-state wine, to
pass through an in-state wholesaler and retailer before reaching
consumers. These two extra layers of overhead increase the cost of outof-state wines to Michigan consumers. The cost differential, and in
some cases the inability to secure a wholesaler for small shipments, can
effectively bar small wineries from the Michigan market.
Id. at 473–74.
62
See id.
63
Id. at 473 (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356
(1951)); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521–23
(1935).
64
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473.
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C. New York’s Putative Interests—Preventing Minors’ Access
to Alcohol and Efficient Tax Collection—Can Be Achieved
Through Nondiscriminatory Alternatives

New York is unable to justify its discrimination against
interstate commerce because it is unable to put forward legitimate
local purposes that “cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”65 When New York’s legislature
enacted its three-tier liquor licensing system seventy-five years
ago, its primary goals were to prevent minors’ access to alcohol
and to assist state tax collection.66 The legislature also aimed “to
promote temperance by keeping the price of alcohol artificially
high.”67 To justify its discrimination against out-of-state retailers,

65

New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); see also
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (“Facial discrimination by
itself may be a fatal defect” and “at a minimum . . . invokes strictest scrutiny.”);
see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“[O]nce a state law is
shown to discriminate against interstate commerce either on its face or in
practical effects, [the Supreme Court has held] the burden falls on the State to
demonstrate both that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, and that this
purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
66
Alix M. Freedman & John R. Emshwiller, Vintage System: Big Liquor
Wholesaler Finds Change Stalking Its Very Private World, W ALL ST . J., Oct.
4, 1999, at A1. By requiring producers to sell their alcoholic beverages through
wholesalers, New York’s legislature “hoped to collect taxes more efficiently and
to limit alcohol sales to minors.” FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 6; see also
N.Y. ALCO. BEV . CONT . LAW § 65 (Gould 2007); N.Y. T AX LAW §§ 420–45,
1105(a), (d) (Gould 2007) (excise and sales taxes); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 20, §§ 60.1 et seq. (2007) (taxes on alcoholic beverages); Arnold’s
Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
67
Having the producers sell to distributors who then sold the alcoholic
beverages to retailers raised the price of alcohol by creating an extra link in the
chain of distribution. By raising the price of alcohol, one might argue, one
lowers the rate of consumption. It is hard to gauge the extent to which this goal
still guides lawmakers, but to the extent that it does, it would explain why
some lawmakers are less receptive to the argument that direct shipping is a good
thing because it increases competition and lowers prices for alcohol consumers.
See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
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the State of New York again put forward two of these interests:
preventing the access of minors to alcohol and efficiently collecting
taxes.68 These two interests, however, failed to justify similar
discrimination in Granholm, where the majority concluded that
“the State . . . provide[d] little concrete evidence for the sweeping
assertion that they cannot police direct shipments by out-of-state
wineries,” and for the same reasons, these two interests again do
not justify discriminating against out-of-state retailers.69
First, preventing minors’ access to alcohol can be achieved by
the nondiscriminatory alternative of requiring an adult signature
upon delivery. 70 As the NYSLA itself has announced, “shipping
companies like FedEx are required . . . to receive approval from the
[NYSLA] before transporting wine directly to New York residents,
ensuring that common carriers have the proper systems in place
enabling them to accurately capture and verify a recipient’s age.”71
These safeguards achieve the state’s interest in preventing minors’
access to alcohol without discriminating against out-of-state
retailers. Further, of the twenty-six States that allow direct
shipping, none report problems with underage drinking and
officials openly recognize a number of reasons why underage
drinkers find online wine purchases unappealing, not least of which
is that underage drinkers seek immediate gratification, not several
days of waiting for a shipment to arrive.72 Because preventing
68

See Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F.Supp. 2d at 407.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492 (2005).
70
Id. at 489–91.
71
Press Release, State of New York Executive Dep’t Div. of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, State Liquor Authority Announces Approval of FedEx to
Make Direct Wine Shipments to New Yorkers: Approval Offers N.Y. Residents
Greater Choice and Convenience (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.abc.state.ny.
us/system/files/mediaadvisory020906.pdf.
72
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490 (“A recent study by . . . the FTC found
that the 26 States currently allowing direct shipments report no problems with
minors’ increased access to wine. This is not surprising for several reasons.
First, minors are less likely to consume wine, as opposed to beer, wine coolers,
and hard liquor. Second, minors who decide to disobey the law have more direct
means of doing so. Third, direct shipping is an imperfect avenue of obtaining
alcohol for minors who, in the words of the past president of the National
Conference of State Liquor Administrators, ‘want instant gratification.’
69
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minors’ access to alcohol can be achieved without discriminating
against out-of-state retailers, this state interest does not support
discriminating against out-of-state retailers.73
Second, with respect to efficient tax collection, as the Supreme
Court explained in Granholm: “[I]mprovements in technology have
eased the burden of monitoring out-of-state wineries. Background
checks can be done electronically. Financial records and sales data
can be mailed, faxed, or submitted via e-mail.”74 New York is
equally capable of running background checks on out-of-state
retailers, especially in light of out-of-state retailers’ ability to
provide New York with their financial records and sales data.
Further, the risk of tax evasion presented by online sales does not
change with or without the prohibition on direct sales by out-ofstate wine retailers.75 Further still, since Granholm, New York has
collected “taxes directly from out-of-state wineries whose products
are sold in the state.”76 In projecting whether New York will be
able to collect taxes efficiently from out-of-state retailers, it is
particularly instructive that New York has not reported problems
collecting taxes from out-of-state wineries.77 In sum, because
modern technology allows taxes to be collected efficiently without
discriminating against out-of-state retailers, this interest does not
justify New York’s discrimination against out-of-state retailers.78
(explaining why minors rarely buy alcohol via the mail or the Internet).”)
(internal citations omitted).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
As a Michigan district court astutely observed, “there is a risk for tax
evasion with direct shipping, whether in-state or out-of-state.” See Siesta Vill.
Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
12, 2007) (citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490–91).
76
Id.
77
See N.Y. STATE LIQUOR AUTH ., D IV. OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
CONTROL, 2006 A NNUAL REPORT; N.Y. STATE LIQUOR AUTH ., D IV . OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT; see also Press
Release, State of New York Executive Dep’t Div. of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, State Liquor Authority Announces Approval Of Fedex To Make Direct
Wine Shipments To New Yorkers (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.abc.state.ny.us/
system/files/mediaadvisory020906.pdf.
78
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491; see also Siesta Vill. Mkt., 2007 WL
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Despite the Supreme Court’s clear guidance on these issues, the
Arnold’s Wines decision nevertheless cited these two state interests
without any analysis of whether the interests could be achieved in
a manner that avoided discrimination against out-of-state retailers. 79
In making the case for judgment in favor of its discrimination, New
York should have been required to provide “more than mere
speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods”
and should have been required to meet the higher burden of
showing that “the discrimination is demonstrably justified.”80
However, unlike in Granholm, where the Supreme Court refused to
allow New York to make sweeping assertions about its inability to
police direct shipments by out-of-state wine producers without
concrete evidence,81 the Arnold’s Wines opinion appears to have
accepted New York’s justifications without further scrutiny. 82
New York should have had to make at least a concrete showing that
it could neither collect taxes effectively nor prevent minors’ access
to alcohol without the discriminatory direct shipping laws.83 The
State likely would have been unable to produce such evidence and
meet such a burden.84 At bottom, neither interest put forward
excuses New York’s discrimination against out-of-state retailers
because both efficient tax collection and preventing minors’ access
to alcohol can be achieved without such discrimination.

2984127, at *5.
79
See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
80
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492 (quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992)).
81
See id. at 490.
82
See Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
83
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492 (quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 504
U.S. at 344).
84
See id. at 490; see also Siesta Vill. Mkt., 2007 WL 2984127, at *4–5.
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II. T HE N ATIONAL I NTEREST IN FREE TRADE O UTWEIGHS NEW
YORK’S INTEREST IN AN ABSOLUTE BAN ON I NTERSTATE DIRECT
SHIPPING
The federal interest in free trade outweighs New York’s interest
in using its ban on interstate direct shipping to favor in-state
retailers with exclusive access to the New York direct shipping
consumer market. As the Arnold’s Wines decision correctly
observed, on the facts, the Supreme Court’s Granholm decision
pertains directly to differential treatment of in-state and out-ofstate producers. 85 The Arnold’s Wines decision, however, errs in
arguing that the principles in Granholm only apply to an exception
to the three-tier licensing system, direct shipping by wine
producers to wine consumers that bypasses wholesalers and
retailers, and not to the three-tier licensing system itself.86 More to
the point, however, a challenge to New York’s use of its ban on
interstate shipping to favor in-state retailers at the expense of outof-state retailers in no way amounts to an attack on the entire
three-tier system, and striking down New York’s use of the ban to
unfairly privilege its own retailers would neither invalidate nor
undermine the three-tier system, even if out-of-state retailers
bypass in-state wholesalers.87 First of all, it is a logical fallacy to
argue that “allowing out-of-state retailers to compete in a state’s
domestic market ‘is clearly an attack on the three-tier system
itself.’”88 On a practical level, though, New York could maintain
centralized control and enforce compliance with its regulations by
85

Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 412.
Id. at 411.
87
See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D.
Tex. 2008) (“[A] state can treat in-state and out-of-state entities on equal terms
and still preserve its three-tier system.”); see also N.Y. ALCO. BEV . CONT .
LAW §§1–164 (Gould 2007); see also Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at
403.
88
See Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 867 n.19 (“[I]t does not follow that
allowing out-of-state retailers to compete in a state’s domestic market ‘is clearly
an attack on the three-tier system itself.’”) (quoting Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515
F. Supp. 2d at 411).
86
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using a direct shipping permit system similar to the one it currently
administers to out-of-state wineries.89 In balancing and attempting
to harmonize the Twenty-first Amendment with the federal
Commerce Clause, on the particular issue of New York’s use of its
ban on interstate shipping to favor its in-state retailers, the federal
Commerce Clause interest in promoting free trade surely outweighs
New York’s Twenty-first Amendment in regulating alcohol.
A. The Supreme Court Struck Down Shipping Laws That
Discriminated Against Out-of-State “Economic
Interests”
The most ready explanation for why, on the facts, the Supreme
Court’s Granholm decision applies to out-of-state producers is
because it was out-of-state producers who were challenging New
York’s ban on direct shipping.90 The Granholm majority, however,
broadened the prospective effect of the decision by focusing “more
on discrimination against out-of-state economic interest and access
to out-of-state markets, rather than, specifically, on out-of-state
wine producers.”91 The plain language of the Granholm majority
opinion stresses the need to broadly protect out-of-state
“economic interests” from economic protectionism as opposed to
protect out-of-state wine producers exclusively.92 Out-of-state
wine retailers who want to compete with in-state retailers in the
New York market possess such an “economic interest.”93
The Granholm majority articulated an underlying principle of
“mutual economic interests” behind the enforcement of the
89

See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 491 (2005); see also Perry, 530
F. Supp. 2d at 867.
90
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
91
Siesta Vill. Mkt., 2006 WL 2984127, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2007)
(citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472–73) (emphasis added).
92
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (“Time and again this Court has held that,
in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause
if they mandate ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’”) (quoting Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
93
Id. at 474–75.
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Commerce Clause94 in which “[r]ivalries among the States are . . .
kept to a minimum, and a proliferation of trade zones is
prevented.”95 The Granholm majority used these broad principles
to scrutinize laws that allowed in-state, but not out-of-state,
wineries to ship directly to customers. The majority wrote:
Laws of the type at issue in the instant cases contradict
these principles. They deprive citizens of their right to have
access to the markets of other States on equal terms. The
perceived necessity for reciprocal sale privileges risks
generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances
and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in particular, the
Commerce Clause were designed to avoid.96
In short, the laws were offensive and violated the Commerce
Clause not because they discriminated against out-of-state
producers and their products in particular, but because the laws
offended an underlying principle of “mutual economic interests” by
“depriv[ing] citizens of their right to have access to the markets of
other States on equal terms.”97 In transposing the principles of
Granholm to the ongoing discrimination against out-of-state
retailers, then, it is more reasonable to focus on the majority
opinion’s broad language with respect to protecting out-of-state
“economic interests” than to narrowly limit, as in the improvident
Arnold’s Wine decision, the rights recognized in Granholm to only
out-of-state “wine producers.”98
94

See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (“The rule prohibiting state
discrimination against interstate commerce follows also from the principle that
States should not be compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or
disfavored status for their own citizens. States do not need, and may not
attempt, to negotiate with other States regarding their mutual economic
interests.”) (citing U.S. C ONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3) (emphasis added).
95
Id. (citing C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390
(1994) (citing T HE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143–45 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of
the United States, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 362–63 (G. Hunt ed.,
1901).
96
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005).
97
Id.
98
Id.
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“State policies are protected under the Twenty-first
Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same
as its domestic equivalent.”99 This language of Granholm does not
mean that the Twenty-first Amendment shields New York’s use of
shipping laws to reserve “the exclusive right to sell, deliver, and
transport wine directly to New York consumers” to in-state
retailers simply because their out-of-state retail competitors are not
producers.100 The same general principles enunciated in Granholm
still generally apply. It thus sounds willfully obtuse to declare, as
in Arnold’s Wines, that “In upholding the three-tier system, the
Supreme Court acted intentionally to limit application of the
nondiscrimination principle enunciated in Granholm to products
and producers as opposed to wholesalers and retailers. . . .”101 In
Siesta Village Market v. Perry, the Texas district court
“respectfully disagree[d]” with this interpretation, and observed
that “[t]he laws in question in Arnold’s Wines do not appear to
satisfy that requirement [of treating out of state and domestic
liquor the same].”102
In Siesta Village Market, Texas residents and out-of-state
retailers challenged the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code’s
provisions restricting the right to ship directly to Texas customers
to retailer residing in the same county. 103 The court determined that
“[t]he Code facially discriminates . . . [by] giving in-state wine
retailers access to the direct-shipping markets of their respective
counties, while denying the same access to out-of-state wine
retailers.”104 Similarly, in Michigan, where the same out-of-state
retailer, Siesta Village Market, is currently challenging shipping
provisions nearly identical to New York’s provisions, the court
99

Id. at 489.
Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D. Tex.
2008) (quoting Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
101
515 F. Supp. at 412.
102
530 F. Supp. 2d at 867 n.19.
103
See 530 F. Supp. 2d 848; T EX . A LCO. BEV . CODE ANN. §§ 6.03,
11.46(a)(11), 11.61(b)(19), 22.03, 24.01(c), 24.03, 54.12, 107.05(a), 107.07(a),
107.07(f), 109.53 (Vernon 2007).
104
Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
100
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denied the State of Michigan’s motion to dismiss and disagreed
with the State’s explanation for the discrimination against out-ofstate retailers.105 Michigan argued that under its bans on interstate
direct shipping, “liquor produced out-of-state” was treated “the
same as its domestic equivalent”106 and that “whether produced in
Michigan or elsewhere, . . . wine cannot be directly shipped to
Michigan consumers from out-of-state retailers, and [that] in that
sense the products are treated equally.”107 Michigan essentially
asserted that because its shipping laws discriminated between
retailers based on a wine product’s current location rather than its
origin, the federal interest in promoting free trade was not
implicated.108 Refusing to “limit the holding of Granholm in a way
that is debatable,”109 the court recognized that the general language
in Granholm made it difficult to limit its effect to producers.110
In light of the plain reading of Granholm found in the Siesta
Market analyses, there is little support for the Arnold’s Wines
holding that the principles found in the Granholm decision
narrowly apply to an exception to the three-tier licensing system—
direct shipping by wine producers to in-state wine consumers—
and do not apply to other discriminatory aspects of the three-tier
licensing system.111 The Supreme Court in Granholm, far from
distinguishing shipping laws pertaining to wine producers from
those pertaining to retailers, directly compared the shipping rights
of wine producers and retailers, observing: “Michigan, for example,
already allows its licensed retailers (over 7,000 of them) to deliver
alcohol directly to consumers.”112 The thrust and breadth of the
105

See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127,
at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2007).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. (“[I]n light of a broad reading of Granholm, [the argument that a
State is treating out-of-state products equally] may not pass constitutional
muster under the Commerce Clause.”).
111
See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 411
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
112
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 490 (2005).
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Granholm decision gives ample reason to conclude that the
principles and holding of the case protect out-of-state retailers as
well as producers from economic protectionism.113
B. Treating Out-of-State Competitors the Same as In-State
Wine Retailers Would Not Invalidate New York’s
“Unquestionably Legitimate” Licensing System
It is illogical to argue that striking down New York’s use of its
ban on direct shipping to favor in-state retailers with exclusive
access to New York’s direct shipping wine consumer market “is
clearly an attack on the three-tier system itself.”114 To the
contrary, treating out-of-state competitors the same as in-state
retailers neither invalidates nor undermines New York’s longstanding three-tier system.115 As observed in the Texas Siesta
Village Market decision, “a state can treat in-state and out-of-state
entities on equal terms and still preserve its three-tier system.”116
Similarly, when it struck down New York’s use of its ban on
interstate direct shipping to favor in-state wineries, the Granholm
majority declared that striking down the provisions did not “call
into question [the constitutionality of New York’s] three-tier
system.”117 As in Granholm and Siesta Village Market, it does not
follow that striking down New York’s protectionist use of its ban
on interstate direct shipping “is clearly an attack on the three-tier

113

See generally id.; see also Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455–
56 (1940) (“The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or
ingenious. In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under
attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work
discrimination against interstate commerce.”).
114
Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D. Tex.
2008). (“[A] state can treat in-state and out-of-state entities on equal terms and
still preserve its three-tier system. Therefore, it does not follow that allowing
out-of-state retailers to compete in a state’s domestic market ‘is clearly an attack
on the three-tier system itself.’”) (quoting Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp.
2d at 411).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488.
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system itself.”118
Simplifying a complex matter, the Fourth Circuit opined in
Brooks v. Vassar that any “argument that compares the status of
an in-state retailer with an out-of-state retailer—or that compares
the status of any other in-state entity under the three-tier system
with its out-of-state counterpart—is nothing different than an
argument challenging the three-tier system.”119 Under the Brooks
analysis, then, the Supreme Court’s act in upholding the challenge
to New York’s differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
wineries, that is, an “in-state entity” with its “out-of-state
counterparty,” was ultimately a “challenge to the three-tier
system” acceptable to the Supreme Court.120 As the Arnold’s Wine
decision correctly observed, “all nine Justices [in Granholm] agreed
that [New York’s three-tier system] is within the scope of
Commerce Clause immunity granted [to] the States by Section 2 of
the Twenty-first Amendment and that ‘state policies are protected
under the Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor
produced out-of-state the same as its domestic equivalent.’”121
What is crucial in this language, however, is that under Granholm,
provisions of such laws are only protected under the Twenty-first
Amendment to the extent that they treat “liquor produced out-ofstate the same as its domestic equivalent.”122 The Twenty-first
Amendment neither shields state laws that violate other provisions
of the Constitution123 nor abrogates Congress’s federal Commerce
Clause powers with regard to liquor,124 not least of which is that
118

Id.
Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F. 3d 341, 352 (4th Cir. 2006).
120
Id.
121
Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2007); see also
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Granholm, 544 U.S. at
517–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
122
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
123
See, e.g., Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
124
See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712–13
(1984) (“[To conclude] that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated
to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is
concerned would . . . be an absurd over-simplification. . . . Notwithstanding the
119
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“state regulation of alcohol is limited by the Commerce Clause’s
nondiscrimination principle.”125
Despite guidance from the Supreme Court on the enduring
applicability of this principle to state regulation of alcoholic
beverages in general, the Arnold’s Wines court incorrectly
determined that “the nondiscrimination principle enunciated in
Granholm [is limited] to products and producers as opposed to
wholesalers and retailers. . . .”126 The Granholm court, however,
did not specify that the Commerce Clause governs state regulation
of products but instead used more encompassing language, such as
referring to “state regulation of alcohol” in general.127 Though it
may sound fair to argue that “[t]he limited exception afforded
under the Code for direct sales by wineries does not permit the
conclusion that [a State] has relinquished its right to regulate the
vast remainder of wine sales through its three-tier system,” this
argument misplaces a basic proposition in Granholm: the right to
regulate wine sales through the three-tier system is not a right to
discriminate against interstate commerce with impunity, or even to
dictate that all wine must flow through the three-tier system.128 On
this latter point, a majority of the Supreme Court in North Dakota
v. United States determined that the Twenty-first Amendment did
not authorize North Dakota to require all liquor sold for use in the
State to be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler; in other
words, the military could bypass North Dakota’s three-tier
system.129
Amendment’s broad grant of power to the States, therefore, the Federal
Government plainly retains authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate
even interstate commerce in liquor.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
125
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487 (2005) (citing Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)).
126
Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); see also id. at 487; Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 276.
127
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487 (citing, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468
U.S. at 276).
128
Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 870 (N.D. Tex. 2008)
(citing Brooks v. Vasser, 462 F.3d 341, 345, 349, 350 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006);
Brooks, 462 F.3d at 352 n.3 (Neimeyer, J., concurring); Granholm, 544 U.S. at
487.
129
See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).
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C. Though New York’s Long-Standing Three-tier System Has
Historical Pedigree, It Can and Must Be Modified When
It Harms the Federal Interest in Free Trade

Like other states that have adopted a ‘three-tier’ licensing
system, New York regulates the importation and sale of wine by
requiring separate licenses for producers, wholesalers, and
retailers.130 Of these three “tiers” of licensees, producers are
licensed to make wine; wholesalers to distribute it within the state;
and retailers to sell it to New York consumers.131 This three-tier
system remains a testament to the man perhaps most responsible
for its basic form, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a self-described
teetotaler and supporter of Prohibition who near its end in 1933
commissioned a study on how New York could best regulate the
alcohol industry.132
From 1920 to 1933, the Eighteenth Amendment had banned the
sale, manufacture, and transportation of alcoholic beverages within
the United States.133 By 1933, however, the lack of legal regulation
had resulted in a nationwide illegal industry that produced and
distributed alcoholic beverages, keeping the American public well
supplied.134 New York’s licensing system thus began as a direct
response to the failure of Prohibition.135
In early 1933, as it became clear that the proposed Twentyfirst Amendment would probably be ratified, then Governor
130

See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 1,
at 5–7. Federal and state laws limit vertical overlap between tiers of licensees.
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466; 27 U.S.C. § 205 (2007); see, e.g., Bainbridge
v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 2002).
131
See N.Y. ALCO. BEV . CONT . LAW §§ 3(20), (26), (35), 103–05 (Gould
2007).
132
See Harry Gene Levine, The Birth of American Alcohol Control, 12
CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 63, 84 (1985).
133
See U.S. CONST . amend. XVIII, § 1 (“[T]he manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.”), repealed by
U.S. C ONST . amend. XXI.
134
See Levine, supra note 132, at 83.
135
Id. at 84.
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Lehman of New York asked Rockefeller to commission a private
study that compared methods of alcohol regulation.136 In late 1933,
Rockefeller published the study, entitled Toward Liquor Control,
which was popularly known as the Rockefeller Report.137
Rockefeller’s report gave detailed proposals for two methods of
liquor regulation: state-run monopolies and state licensing
systems.138 New York’s state legislators adopted the state licensing
system.139 By 1937, twenty-six States had implemented licensing
systems, eighteen States had implemented monopolies, and the rest
remained dry, that is, they continued to ban the sale of alcohol.140
Almost every state that implemented a licensing system limited
the retail, wholesale, and manufacturing licenses it issued to
residents of the state or domestic corporations.141 Today, most
States still use the three-tier system to regulate alcohol, and the
system enjoys wide support as the preferred means of regulating
the alcoholic beverages industry within the federal system.142 In
136

Id.
Id. at 86–87; see also John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Foreword to TOWARD
LIQUOR CONTROL, at viii (Raymond B. Fosdick & Albert L. Scott, eds.,
1933).
138
See Levine, supra note 132, at 93.
139
Id. at 89, 95; see also FTC R EPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
140
See Robert H. Skilton, State Power Under the Twenty-First
Amendment, 7 BROOK. L. R EV . 342, 345–46 & nn.18–19 (1937).
141
Notes, Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage LawsExperience Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 72 HARV. L. REV . 1145, 1148
(1959); see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 518 n.6 (2005) (Thomas J.,
dissenting) (listing the residency, citizenship, or physical presence requirements
of twenty States during the 1930s of Colorado (“residency”), Florida
(“prohibiting out-of-state manufacturers from being distributors”), Illinois
(“residency”), Indiana (“residency”), Maryland (“residency”), Massachusetts
(“residency”), Michigan (“residency”), Missouri (“citizenship”), Nebraska
(“residency” and “physical presence”), Nevada (“residency and physical
presence”), New Jersey (“citizenship and residency”), North Carolina
(“residency”), North Dakota (“citizenship and residency”), Ohio (“residency and
physical presence”), Rhode Island (“residency”), South Dakota (“residency”),
Vermont (“residency”), Washington (“physical presence” and “citizenship and
residency”), Wisconsin (“citizenship and residency”), and Wyoming
(“citizenship and residency”).).
142
See State Shipping LawsThe Wine Institute, available at
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limiting direct shipment to in-state wine retailers, then, New
York’s three-tier system is consistent with the practices of the
majority of states that permit some level of direct shipping.143
Currently, of the thirty-five States that permit some level of direct
shipping to in-state consumers, only fourteen permit out-of-state
wine retailers to ship directly to consumers.144
Although the three-tier system is long-standing, widely used,
and “unquestionably legitimate,” this is not to say that the system
is perfect or inviolate.145 As Granholm demonstrated, the system
can and must be modified when it violates the dormant aspect of
the Commerce Clause.146 In that case, out-of-state wineries
challenged Michigan and New York shipping laws that allowed instate wineries to bypass wholesalers and retailers and ship directly
to in-state consumers while denying that same opportunity to outof-state wine retailers.147 The Supreme Court rejected New York’s
argument that out-of-state wineries were seeking “nothing less than
the dismantling of New York’s 70-year-old three-tier distribution
system.”148 The Granholm majority explained:
The States argue that any decision invalidating their directshipment laws would call into question the
constitutionality of the three-tier system. This does not
follow from our holding. . . . States may . . . assume direct
control of liquor distribution through state-run outlets or
funnel sales through the three-tier system. . . . State policies

http://www.wineinstitute.org/initiatives/stateshippinglaws (last visited Apr. 6,
2008).
143
See id.
144
See Peck, supra note 2, at 22; see also Press Release, Specialty Wine
Retailer’s Ass’n, New Wine Retailer Association Formed to Ensure Consumer
Access to National Wine Market (Mar. 6, 2006), available at http://www.
specialtywineretailers.org/forms/SWRA%20Intro%20Release%20FINAL.pdf.
145
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488–89 (quoting North Dakota v. United States,
495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990)); see also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 447 (Scalia J.,
concurring).
146
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
147
See id. at 465–66.
148
Brief for Respondents, Swedenburg v. Kelly, No. 03-1274, 2004 WL
2138121, at *12–13 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2004).
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are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment when
they treat liquor produced out-of-state the same as its
domestic equivalent. The instant cases, in contrast, involve
straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of local
producers. The discrimination is contrary to the Commerce
Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment.149
As Granholm demonstrated, although the general three-tier
system may be legitimate, certain portions are severable and can be
struck down as unconstitutional without rendering the remainder of
the regulatory scheme impractical or invalid.150 New York’s use of
the ban on interstate direct shipping to provide its in-state retailers
with exclusive access to New York’s lucrative consumer market 151
are not “an integral part of the three-tier system upheld by the
Supreme Court in Granholm.”152 If New York ceased its
discrimination against out-of-state wine retailers, it could still
maintain centralized control over the regulation of alcohol “by
requiring a permit as a condition of direct shipping.”153 The
Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of “the constitutionality of the
three-tier system” in no way supports the conclusion that any
challenge to ABC Laws “must fail.”154 To the contrary, the
Granholm majority at once upheld the constitutionality of the
three-tier system and severed and struck down the unequal

149

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488–89 (2005).
See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 869 (N.D. Tex.
2008) (“A decision . . . that invalidates components of a state’s direct-shipment
laws does not necessarily call into question the constitutionality of the state’s
three-tier system.”) (citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488); see also Siesta Vill.
Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
12, 2007).
151
See N.Y. ALCO. BEV . CONT . LAW §§ 100(1), 102(1)(a), 102(1)(b)
(Gould 2007).
152
Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413–14
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
153
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491; see also Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 867
(holding that the lack of proof that Texas would encounter difficulty collecting
taxes in the context of alcohol sales is fatal).
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Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
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treatment of in-state and out-of-state shippers, establishing that
state laws regulating the distribution of alcohol must be in harmony
with the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause:155
If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must
do so on evenhanded terms. Without demonstrating the
need for discrimination, New York and Michigan have
enacted regulations that disadvantage out-of-state wine
producers. Under our Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
these regulations cannot stand.156
By choosing to allow the direct shipment of wine to in-state
consumers, New York took on the added responsibility of treating
in-state and out-of-state business interests equally. Although the
Arnold’s Wines court may validly maintain that “[the Twenty-first
Amendment] authorizes the States to require all sellers of alcoholic
beverages to obtain permits and . . . nothing in Granholm alters this
result,”157 it cannot use this line of reasoning to undermine the basic
proposition in Granholm that New York, after allowing direct
shipments of wine in general, cannot grant this right to some and
deny it to others on the basis of state citizenship alone.158
In upholding the constitutionality of the three-tier system in
general in North Dakota v. United States, the Supreme Court did so
without using a Commerce Clause analysis. 159 The plurality
opinion found that the challenged regulations were “within the core
of the State’s power under the Twenty-first Amendment” because
North Dakota’s legislature had enacted them “in the interest of
promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and
raising revenue.”160 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
observed that the Twenty-first Amendment “empowers North
155

See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489–93 (2005).
Id. at 493.
157
Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 411; see also State Bd. of
Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 60–62 (1936)
(affirming that the Twenty-first Amendment authorizes a state licensing fee to
wholesale importers even though it is a “direct burden on interstate commerce”).
158
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See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
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Dakota to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be
purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler.”161 As observed in
Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle,162 nine Supreme Court justices were
in agreement that North Dakota’s three-tier system was
“unquestionably legitimate.”163 A majority of the Court, however,
declined to join Justice Scalia in arguing that the Twenty-first
Amendment allowed North Dakota to require that all liquor sold
for use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state
wholesaler.164 This is not a matter of settled law, but what is clear
is that New York’s use of a ban on interstate direct shipping is not
so clearly, as asserted in Arnold’s Wines, “within the authority
granted to New York by the Twenty-first Amendment.”165
III. STRIKING D OWN N EW YORK’S USE OF THE BAN D OES N OT
ABROGATE N EW YORK’S T WENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Striking down New York’s use of the ban on interstate direct
shipping laws to discriminate against out-of-state retailers would
not be an abrogation of New York’s Twenty-first Amendment
rights because the shipping laws exist within the limitations of a
superseding federal framework in which the dormant aspect of the
Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate
commerce. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment states: “The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.”166 The language of the amendment differs subtly but
importantly from the language of the predecessor Webb-Kenyon
Act, which prohibited the interstate shipment of liquor into a State
“in violation of any law of such State,” with the phrase “any law”
suggesting that “any law, including a ‘discriminatory’ one,” was

161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 447.
515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Id. at 413 (citing North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432).
Id.
Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 414.
U.S. C ONST . amend. XXI, § 2.
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permissible.167 As the Court explained in Granholm, this notable
change in language from “any laws” in the Webb-Kenyon Act to
simply “laws” in the amendment reflects the basic proposition that
the “Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede other
provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace
the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to
their own producers.”168
Although the court in Arnold’s Wines correctly observed that
the Granholm majority “concluded that Section 2 [of the Twentyfirst Amendment] restored to the States the Commerce Clause
immunity provided by the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts,”169 a
review of these Acts and their reception by the Supreme Court
demonstrates that these Acts did not immunize State regulation of
alcohol from the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause.170 To
the contrary, when the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts were
passed into law, States were no more able to discriminate against
out-of-State liquor providers then they were against in-state
providers.171 Rather than empower States to treat in-state and outof-state competitors differently, these Acts standardized how a
State regulated domestic and imported liquor, giving States the
power to treat both equally.172 To the extent that the Twenty-first
Amendment was modeled on the language of these predecessor
Acts, and these Acts did not immunize states from the
nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause, the Twentyfirst Amendment itself must be understood as existing within the
ambit of the Commerce Clause.173 As contemporary commentators
explained in the aftermath of the repeal of Prohibition:
The adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment does not, as
many people think, wipe the slate clean for completely new
167

Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (quoting Granholm, 544
U.S. at 500 (Thomas, J., dissenting)) (quoting 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2007)).
168
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 486.
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systems of liquor control. It leaves untouched the laws and
constitutional provisions now existing in the various states.
Moreover, a number of federal statutes relating to liquor
were passed before the adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment and have never been repealed. After a period of
more or less suspended animation, these laws now revive
and may become potent instruments of control.174
A. Before Prohibition and the Passing of the Twenty-first
Amendment, the Commerce Clause Prohibited States
from Burdening Interstate Commerce Involving Alcohol
The Twenty-first Amendment was drafted with the knowledge
that preexisting laws and doctrines, like the Commerce Clause,
would prevent states from using the Amendment to burden
interstate commerce.175 It was commonly understood that the
Amendment did not “wipe the slate clean.”176 In particular, prior
Supreme Court cases interpreted two pre-Prohibition statutes—the
Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act—that both influenced the
drafting of Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 177 When the
Supreme Court reviewed these cases in Granholm, two distinct
principles emerged.178 First, the cases collectively held that the
Commerce Clause prohibited state discrimination against imported
liquor.179 Second, the cases as a group held that the dormant aspect
of the Commerce Clause prohibited states from passing “facially
neutral laws that placed an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.”180 These two distinct principles stand for the
proposition that the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause
prevents states from using the Twenty-first Amendment to burden

174

RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT , TOWARD LIQUOR
CONTROL 20 (1933).
175
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476.
176
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177
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interstate commerce.181
In the earliest cases, before the Wilson Act was passed in 1890,
the Supreme Court used the dormant aspect of the Commerce
Clause to invalidate state liquor regulations. 182 In Bowman v.
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., for instance, the Supreme
Court struck down an Iowa law that prohibited common carriers
from transporting liquor into Iowa from another State unless it was
certified beforehand that the recipient was authorized to sell the
liquor.183 The Supreme Court explained that the Commerce Clause
prohibits even nondiscriminatory regulations “directly affecting
interstate commerce.”184 After Bowman, however, the question
remained whether a State could ban the sale of imported liquor after
it had arrived in the State.185 This issue was resolved two years
later in Leisy v. Hardin, when the Supreme Court held that Iowa
could not ban the sale of imported beer sold in “original packages,”
and that, “in the absence of congressional permission to do so, the
state had no power to interfere by seizure, or any other action, in
prohibition of importation and sale by the foreign or non-resident
importer.”186 Under Leisy, States could ban the sale of liquor made
within the State but could not stop sales of imported liquor.187
To remedy this unequal treatment of in-state and out-of-state
liquor, Congress passed the Wilson Act in 1890, which gave States
the power to regulate imported liquor “upon arrival in such State
. . . to the same extent and in the same manner” as domestic
liquor.188 Eight years later, however, the Supreme Court held that
the Wilson Act did not authorize States to prohibit the importation
of liquor for personal use.189 Although the Supreme Court
181
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186
Id.
187
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recognized that States could ban the sale of imported liquor in its
“original package,” the Court interpreted the phrase “upon arrival”
to mean that State law only controlled after delivery to the in-state
recipient and not when the imported liquor entered into the
State.190 The practical result of this decision was a thriving mail
order liquor business because States could ban the sale of imported
liquor within the State but not the importation of the liquor
itself.191 In effect, the Rhodes decision created a “direct-shipment
loophole.”192
Congress closed this loophole with the Webb-Kenyon Act of
1913.193 The Act solidified the States’ power to regulate the sale of
alcohol and provided that:
[T]he shipment . . . of any . . . intoxicating liquor of any
kind from one State . . . into any other State . . . which . . .
is intended . . . to be received, possessed, sold, or in any
manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in
violation of any law of such State . . . is prohibited.194
Four years later, in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
Railway Co., the Supreme Court acknowledged that, with the
passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act, States had the power to regulate
the transportation of liquor, even though this additional regulatory
power imposed a direct burden on interstate commerce.195
However, as the Granholm majority observed, “The Wilson Act
reaffirmed, and the Webb-Kenyon Act did not displace, the
Court’s line of Commerce Clause cases striking down state laws
that discriminated against liquor produced out of state. . . . States
were required to regulate domestic and imported liquor on equal
terms.”196
As the Granholm majority further observed, “The wording of §
190
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See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 480.
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2 of the Twenty-first Amendment closely follows the WebbKenyon and Wilson Acts, expressing the framers’ clear intention of
constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established
under those statutes.”197 In conclusion, the Granholm majority
determined that:
The aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow
States to maintain an effective and uniform system for
controlling liquor by regulating its transportation,
importation, and use. The Amendment did not give States
the authority to pass nonuniform laws in order to
discriminate against out-of-state goods, a privilege they had
not enjoyed at any earlier time.198
The Court found that “[s]tate policies are protected under the
Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor produced out-ofstate the same as its domestic equivalent.”199
B. The Commerce Clause has Come to Limit States from
Using the Twenty-first Amendment to Burden Interstate
Commerce
Even though the Twenty-first Amendment grants States the
power to regulate alcohol within their borders, the amendment does
not prevent the application of the Commerce Clause to individual
provisions that are clearly discriminatory in nature. 200 In rejoicing
that “the power of a dry state to exclude liquor shipments,
previously protected only by Act of Congress, will be given the
added sanction of an express constitutional guarantee,”
commentators at the time of the passing of the amendment give
telling insight into the fact that the Twenty-first Amendment was
commonly understood to have been designed to preserve a state’s
right to ban completely the sale of alcoholic beverages, not to ban
197

Id. at 484 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1976)).
Id. at 484–85.
199
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the sale of out-of-state beverages while allowing in-state sellers
exclusive access to local markets.201 A series of Supreme Court
cases following the enactment of the amendment illustrate how
“the Twenty-first Amendment did not entirely remove state
regulation of alcohol from the reach of the Commerce Clause.”202
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, for instance, the Supreme
Court struck down a Hawaii statute that exempted local producers
from a state excise tax on liquor and rejected the State of Hawaii’s
argument that the Twenty-first Amendment authorized the State to
discriminate against out-of-state liquor products. 203 Similarly, in
Healy v. Beer Institute, the Supreme Court struck down “price
affirmation” statutes that forced liquor producers to affirm that
they were not charging lower prices for liquor in other states.204 In
his concurrence to the opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that the
statute’s “invalidity is fully established by its facial discrimination
against interstate commerce,” and that this “discriminatory
character eliminates the immunity afforded by the Twenty-first
Amendment.”205 These decisions reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s
basic proposition articulated in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp. that “[l]ike other provisions of the Constitution,” the
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment “each must be
considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues
and interests at stake in any concrete case.”206
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C. The Granholm Majority Determined that Shipping Laws
Favoring In-State Businesses Burden Interstate
Commerce

In reviewing Michigan and New York’s ban on interstate direct
shipping that favored in-state wineries at the expense of out-ofstate competitors, the Granholm majority found that the statutes
“involve[d] straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of
local producers.”207 The Granholm majority held that “the
Twenty-first Amendment does not immunize all [state liquor] laws
from Commerce Clause challenge.”208 As the Texas Siesta Village
Market plaintiffs observed, “Nowhere in the majority opinion in
Granholm is there the slightest whiff of a suggestion that a
discriminatory part of a three-tier system is legitimate.”209 As the
Granholm majority explained:
State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce
face a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity. . . .’ The Michigan
and New York laws by their own terms violate this
proscription. The two States, however, contend their
statutes are saved by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
. . . . The States’ position is inconsistent with our
precedents and with the Twenty-first Amendment’s history.
Section 2 does not allow States to regulate the direct
shipment of wine on terms that discriminate. . . .”210
Within this framework, the Granholm Court concluded that the
States’ direct shipment laws, allowing in-state, but not out-ofstate, wineries to ship directly to in-state customers, were not
authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment.211 Where, as here, the
aspect of New York’s ban on interstate direct shipping that
discriminates in favor of in-state retailers comes as a direct result of
New York’s choice to allow the direct shipment of wine, such
207
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discrimination finds no protection in the Twenty-first Amendment
under Granholm. Though New York has “virtually complete
control” over in-state liquor distribution, “there is a marked
difference between ‘virtually complete control’ and absolute
control,” and New York cannot unduly burden interstate
commerce.212 The Supreme Court has declared that it will strike
down New York law that “‘directly regulates or discriminates
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests.’”213 By giving
exclusive access to New York’s lucrative direct shipping wine
market to its own in-state retailers, New York has protected its
own business at the expense of interstate commerce. Nothing in the
Twenty-first Amendment justifies such economic protectionism.214
CONCLUSION
The issue of direct shipping is a complex matter. The difficulty
in weighing the federal interest in promoting free trade among the
States against each individual State’s interests in regulating alcohol
is reflected in the differing approaches taken by the New York,
Michigan, and Texas courts when addressing whether a state may
create an in-state direct shipping market and grant its in-state
retailers exclusive access to that market by banning interstate direct
shipments of wine.215 Even in the Texas Siesta Village Market
decision, though it correctly balances the federal Commerce Clause
interest in free trade against the States’ Twenty-first Amendment
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interest in regulating alcohol, the court falters in determining that,
while bans on direct interstate shipping are unconstitutional, the
Texas Code requirement that out-of-state retailers can only sell
wine to Texans that had been purchased from Texas wholesalers
withstands Commerce Clause analysis.216 This holding effectively
allows the State of Texas to continue discriminating against out-ofstate retailers whose home states prohibit them from purchasing
wine from wholesalers in other states, including Texas.217
The underlying problem faced by both the New York and
Texas courts is how to remove the provisions within the three-tier
system that harm the federal interest in free trade without
hamstringing the functionality of the three-tier system.218 The
Texas court at least addressed this problem in good faith,
recognizing that treating similarly situated businesses, e.g., in-state
and out-of-state retailers, differently based solely on their location
amounts to base economic protectionism.219 The New York
Arnold’s Wines decision, however, failing as it does to fully
appreciate the federal interest in free trade and in its eagerness to
accept the ban on direct shipping as necessary for upholding the
State interest in maintaining its three-tier system—without a
showing that the three-tier system would fail without the ban on
direct shipping—departs from the nuanced and measured approach
articulated by the Supreme Court in Granholm. 220
The Granholm majority sought to broadly protect out-of-state
“economic interests” as well as producers from discriminatory
state practices221 and demonstrated that aspects of the three-tier
216
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system can and must be modified when they burden free trade
between the States.222 By allowing in-state but not out-of-state
wine retailers to ship directly to in-state customers, New York
discriminates against interstate commerce when a reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternative is available and preferable to
restricting in-state retailersallowing out-of-state retailers to
apply and qualify for direct shipping permits. 223 Modifying New
York’s use of its ban on interstate shipping does not abrogate New
York’s Twenty-first Amendment power to regulate alcohol
because that power exists within a federal framework in which
state laws regulating alcohol cannot discriminate against out-ofstate businesses with impunity and burden interstate commerce.224
For these reasons, the Arnold’s Wines decision should be
reversed. New York should not be able to treat in-state and out-ofstate wine retailers differently solely on the basis of their residence.
Such discrimination violates the federal interest in promoting free
trade among the States, and while New York may try to put a cork
in Granholm v. Heald, there is still plenty left in the bottle.
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